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This paper presents the findings of a longitudinal study of a large corporation’s journey towards becoming an 
ambidextrous organisation in the face of emerging technology. By investigating the interplay between the top 
and middle management, the results show that business intelligence systems allowed the firm to pursue a 
controlled renewal journey that was data-driven, automated, and supported fast organisational learning. This 
substituted for active frontline and middle managers. The change in organisational direction was driven by a 
small and powerful strategic top management group, even though this was a multi-unit firm with more than 
100,000 employees. The main advantage of this type of journey is that the organisation can fully realize the 
advantage of highly centralised formal planning and control while becoming resilient and ambidextrous. A well- 
functioning decision support system, organisational policies and communication strategy can substitute for 
collective sense-making and shared strategic schemas. The results also suggest that management control systems 
can have a profound impact on developing organisational ambidexterity. The article also provides further details 
on the nature and implications of the rhetorical tactics used by the top management team to focus on organ-
isational attention and action.   
1. Introduction 
Despite its growing popularity as an area of study, many researchers 
agree that we still know little about how firms ensure their current and 
future viability. Organisations must renew themselves to close the gap 
between their existing competencies and the evolving basis of compet-
itive advantage in their industry [1]. Scholarly attention has been 
focusing on the role of individuals in balancing exploitation and 
exploration for a long time and argued that the unit of analysis should be 
individuals because organisational ambidexterity reflects their collec-
tive actions (i.e. [2,3]. O’Reilly and Tushman [4] argued that future 
research should investigate how organisational members may assist or 
hinder such managerial decisions. 
Previous studies concluded that large, multi-unit firms rely on the 
involvement of multiple levels of management in a co-evolutionary 
manner (i.e. [5] in which frontline managers can influence the organ-
isational renewal process. Volberda et al. [6] and later Volberda [7]; 
suggested that for successful renewal in hypercompetitive environments 
calls for active middle management. 
Second, for any strategy, no matter how well formulated, the middle 
managers are critical in implementing it. They are the ones who must 
interpret the strategy in the context of daily operations, identify the 
actions required to implement the strategy and communicate and clarify 
to their subordinates [8]. 
The research on how top management team interact with the middle 
management (MMs), how they influence strategy implementation, is 
still in its infancy [9]. Consequently, the interplay between the top and 
middle management in the creation and preservation of organisational 
ambidexterity needs further investigation. Third, despite its acknowl-
edged importance, many high-technology ventures are failing in their 
strategic renewal [10,11]. Organisations fail to notice events and trends, 
external and internal signals, that have potential organizational conse-
quences because they do not resonate with the priorities of the top 
management team [12]. 
To the best of our knowledge, research on firm-level ambidexterity, 
and how it is achieved over time in hypercompetitive environments, is 
still in its early stage. It is therefore important to understand the large- 
scale strategic renewal process (or journey) of a multinational com-
pany in a hypercompetitive environment, what are the interplays be-
tween TMT and MM along such process. The case presented here is 
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unique, in the sense that the renewal journey was enforced neither by 
maturing technology and markets nor by declining revenues. It emerged 
from the ambition of a visionary top management team. We believe that 
studying this firm can help us to understand how the social process 
evolved, who participated in setting the direction, and what roles they 
fulfilled. 
This study was a longitudinal case study, examining the trans-
formation efforts of a multi-unit firm over 9 consecutive years. The firm 
competes in the high-technology sector, the backbone of the new digital 
economy. Competition here is fast-paced and the speed of movement is 
essential to capitalise on opportunities [13]). 
This study makes several contributions to the literature. First, the 
case demonstrates that structural separation is a rewarding way to 
renew the organisational strategy in a hypercompetitive environment. 
Second, in contrast with previous research, the study shows that middle 
managers can remain passive actors in the formulation of the renewal 
strategy. This is enabled by the presence of a strong top-down drive. 
Third, the renewal was a “controlled journey”, because of its highly 
centralised nature. The management control systems were the key en-
ablers of organisational flexibility as well as control over the execution 
and allowed for timely interventions when needed. Therefore, man-
agement control systems are found to have a profound impact on the 
development of organisational ambidexterity, especially for mobilizing 
and incentivising middle managers and the entire organisation to ‘un-
learn’ old routines. 
The first section of the article reviews the literature to explore the 
link between strategic renewal and organisational ambidexterity. We 
then expand the theory by discussing the role of middle management 
and the impact of organisational attention in the strategic renewal 
journey, in particular, to gain greater influence over the process and 
reduce resistance to change efforts. This is followed by a description of 
the methodology and research setting. The next section covers the 
findings, and finally, we discuss the underlying theoretical and mana-
gerial implications. 
2. Literature review 
2.1. The renewal journey and organisational ambidexterity 
Researchers often refer to the process, content, and outcome of ac-
tivities undertaken by firms to renew, augment, and adapt their core 
competencies as “strategic renewal” [6]. This phrase covers the 
refreshment or replacement of organisational attributes and involves the 
reconfiguration of the organisation’s resource patterns, changing its 
strategy, competitive approach or product–market domain [14,86]. 
Strategic renewal, therefore, has two important attributes. First, it 
always involves change. Second, it is a process, a journey that unfolds, in 
which the organisation aims to obtain and use new knowledge and 
innovative behaviour to bring about changes in its core competencies 
[15]. Strategic renewal studies typically apply evolutionary perspectives 
to identify and investigate the distinct phases through which the change 
progresses, as well as the role of change agents and their actions. 
Studies usually focus on a single case, and attempt to understand 
how a particular outcome emerged drawing on evidence and sources of 
explanation at the micro-level (e.g., activities, cognitions, visions, and 
mistakes of organizational leaders and organizational members). 
Analytically, researchers strategy will often decompose timelines into 
blocks or phases. These blocks are likely to be separated at points of 
discontinuity in macro-level features to capture successive micro-macro 
influence cycles [16]. 
Former research has shown evidence that surprisingly few estab-
lished companies manage to renew their core competencies over the 
longer term [10,12,87]. Benner and Tushman [17] noted that this is 
because exploration and exploitation require substantially different 
organisational support. This makes their simultaneous pursuit extremely 
challenging. According to Beer and Nohria [18]; the underlying reason 
is that most organisations have a bias towards exploitation. They tend to 
find comfort in routines, compared with the high risks and costs often 
associated with exploration [19,20]. Some results indicate that 
decreasing formalisation may be associated with increased exploration. 
For example, Mom et al. [21] found that when middle managers have 
higher decision-making authority over how and which tasks should be 
solved, they are more willing to engage in explorative activities. 
Sidhu et al. [22] conceptualised exploration and exploitation as 
knowledge-search behaviour. Li et al. [23] argued that firms exploit by 
searching for knowledge within the organisation itself and explore by 
searching for new knowledge from outside the organisation. Both types 
of the search may occur in two directions: supply-side and demand-side. 
Supply-side searches are all those looking for knowledge about tech-
nology and production aspects, and demand-side searches look for 
knowledge about market structures and segments, product use and 
substitution patterns, and customer preferences and needs [23]. 
2.2. The role of middle-management in the renewal journey 
Surprisingly little is known about the top and middle management 
interactions in developing ambidexterity or how these two echelons 
achieve alignment between their activities [9,24]. 
The top management team (TMT) is usually made up by the CEO and 
senior executives who hold positions at or above the level of vice pres-
ident. TMT members have a key role in the strategic orientation of the 
firm [25]. The term middle management describes managers located 
below top managers but above operations in the hierarchy [26,27]. No 
matter how well a strategy is formulated, middle managers are critical in 
implementing it [28,29]. While change can be directed from the top, it 
still requires that employees understand the change and its intent, as 
well as its implications. The middle managers must interpret the strategy 
in the context of daily operations, identify the actions required to 
implement the strategy and communicate and clarify to their sub-
ordinates [29]. They provide a conduit for employees accepting and 
implementing the change, they did not design and may only partially 
understand themselves [30,31]. 
In his seminal paper, Nonaka [32] argued that because of their 
unique position, middle managers can influence the strategy process by 
mediating vertically between the top and the bottom of the organisation. 
First, complex and geographically dispersed organisations cannot be 
managed by a few individuals or even small groups (e.g. the top man-
agement team alone). Such firms require distributed and interactive 
leadership throughout the organisation, and middle managers, there-
fore, serve as important interfaces between otherwise disconnected ac-
tors and domains [30,33]. Second, middle managers tend to have 
opportunistic motives in implementing an organisational strategy. 
Wickenberg [34] pointed out that they may to some extent have a 
motive to distort reports by exaggerating successes or covering up fail-
ures by concealing important information or framing issues in a 
particular way to direct top management attention to particular areas 
[27]. Also, the strategy sponsored by top management may be unpop-
ular amongst middle managers, and they could have an interest in 
interfering with its implementation. To do so, they may seek to form a 
coalition with other organisational members (coalitions) to stand in 
opposition to the strategy. They may even deliberately take ineffective 
action or create ‘roadblocks’ to implementation, or move to outright 
sabotage of the strategy to prove that it was not a good decision in the 
first place. Passive intervention can also occur, such as giving low pri-
ority to implementation, resulting in unnecessary delays and general 
‘foot-dragging’. These can all seriously compromise the quality of 
implementation, if not postpone it beyond the effective time. Some 
employee resistance to organisational actions is not motivated by mere 
selfishness [35], nevertheless, the structural position of middle man-
agers is argued to give them the power to effectively alter the firm’s 
strategic course [36–38]. In summary, scholars agree that in case of 
major strategic change (e.g. renewal) especially in a hypercompetitive 
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environment, there is likely to have a shift in power relations between 
the top and middle management over the organisation’s course of ac-
tions [6,34]. 
Ocasio and Joseph [39] arrived at a similar conclusion and suggested 
that the strategic renewal journey was a relatively fluid, guided evolu-
tionary process where interactions of organisational members, both 
top-down and bottom-up, are generating the changes in the strategic 
direction of the firm. 
2.3. The role of management control systems in directing the leader’s 
attention 
In contrast, other studies have pointed out that there are formalised 
routines and procedures that can be used by top managers to maintain or 
alter patterns in organisational activity [40,41]. Formerly, management 
control systems (MCS) have been characterized as an impediment or, at 
most cases, counterproductive with innovation (i.e. [42,43], however, 
recent studies in management accounting literature highlight that dy-
namic changes in today’s environment, makes MCS play an essential 
role in innovation by providing forecast data, budget goals, or moni-
toring market responses carefully [44] and support important manage-
rial decisions in different business situations [45]. Khandwalla [46] 
found that the greater the competition, the greater the need for controls, 
and the greater the benefits of using a sophisticated management con-
trol. His results suggest that this is particularly true when there is intense 
product competition. Still, the relationship between organizational 
ambidexterity and control systems (e.g. rewards and compensation 
controls) has received only limited scholarly attention [47]. 
Consequently, the heavy reliance on collaboration across boundaries 
and lateral coordination exhibited in knowledge work called for 
rethinking management control systems to become flexible for framing 
the unpredictable innovations, but also to stay stable for framing 
cognitive models and actions [88]. 
Simons [48] argued that high performing firms attach a great deal of 
importance to the use of management control systems, and the process is 
highly interactive and requires the ongoing attention of managers at all 
levels of the organisation. Data are frequently and regularly interpreted 
and discussed in face-to-face meetings with superiors, subordinates, and 
peers, where underlying data and assumptions are continually chal-
lenged and debated. 
Sami and Alaudin [44] argued that MCSs enables organisations to 
manage the implicit tension between limited attention and unlimited 
opportunities, and can stimulate the leader’s exploration activities while 
simultaneously ensuring the exploitation of pre-set goals. The combi-
nations of different control systems may generate synergy. Similarly, 
Strauβ and Zecher [49] argue that strategic issues such as balancing 
exploratory and exploitative activities may also be pursued with the help 
of management control systems. 
McCarthy and Gordon [50] demonstrated that different types of 
management control systems can work together to balance exploitation 
and exploration in individual R&D organisations. They also explained 
that feedback control systems, which rely on after-the-event information 
(e.g., errors, failures and other unsatisfactory organisational outcomes) 
to correct problems, are essential for exploitation. They promote the 
continuous refinement of organisational practices and capabilities. In 
contrast, ‘feed-forward’ control systems collect before-the-event infor-
mation to anticipate future trends and events, and their effects before 
any changes occur (e.g., in demand). This information helps organisa-
tions to engage in the “exploration and double-loop learning needed for 
individuals and organisations to radically rethink and alter their existing 
capabilities” [50]:244). 
2.4. The role of organisational attention in the renewal journey 
The literature suggests that effective adaptation requires managers to 
scan their internal and external environment. D’Aveni and MacMillan 
[51] measured the allocation of top managers’ attention in surviving 
and failing firms. They found that surviving firms’ top managers paid 
equal attention to the internal and external environment and more 
attention to the output environment than the input environment. In 
contrast, managers of failing firms tended to deny or ignore output 
factors and paid more attention to the input and internal environments. 
They were, therefore, unable to lead their firms to adapt. 
Staw et al. [52] noted that it is not always dysfunctional to focus on 
inputs and internal operations, because efficiency-related actions are 
sometimes enough to keep the firm on track. However, in the face of 
changes in customer needs and demand, or disruptive, emerging tech-
nologies, firms must respond with long-term solutions, such as changing 
strategies or environments [53,54]. Research has also shown that 
incumbent firms in relatively established industries are often vulnerable 
to the disruptive threats posed by an emerging industry [55]. Successful 
firms pay more attention to the output environment because the most 
important critical success factors are output-related: customer needs and 
the product life-cycle [51]. 
Top managers’ readings of the environment hold the key to organ-
isational strategic actions and adaptation models [56]. Many actors may 
be involved in scanning or data processing, but the information is 
assumed to converge and be interpreted for action at the top managerial 
level [57]. 
According to Dutton and Ashford [27]; no issue is inherently stra-
tegic. Issues become strategic when top managers believe that they have 
an impact on organisational performance. 
The attention-based view (ABV) of the firm focuses on how organ-
isational attention shapes organisational adaptation [58]. The actions of 
decision-makers depend on the firm’s structural distribution of attention 
[59]. A strategy is understood as a pattern of organisational attention 
paid to a particular set of issues (e.g., problems, opportunities, and 
threats) and answers (e.g., resource allocation pattern, processes, and 
routines). 
Scholars in attention-based research have argued that power holders 
constitute and institutionalise the firm’s strategic agenda and can ex-
ercise influence over it through rhetorical tactics [15,60,61]. Top 
managers can reconstruct the firm’s attention structures by actively 
communicating strategic agendas [62]. The content of communications 
allows organisational members to co-orient themselves with changes in 
strategic issues, initiatives, and activities throughout the organisation 
(Eg Ref. [63]. 
Moreover, for strategic change, it is critical to change the organisa-
tional vocabulary [64]. To challenge conventional organisational 
thinking, new words and concepts must be nurtured and promoted [65]. 
For example, faced with a changing institutional setting, Intel created a 
new vocabulary emphasising the company as an “industry enabler” 
[62]:161). Strategic change requires discussion, questioning, negotia-
tions, stories, gossip, and rumours as more information is shared and 
understood and multiple perspectives of strategic change emerge [66]. 
The rhetorical tactics of top managers will direct organisation members’ 
attention to selected aspects of the environment to the exclusion of 
others [39]. The middle managers, however, due to their specific role 
within the organisation. 
The attention of middle managers can be driven through different 
mechanisms. These include the use of management control systems and 
the development of knowledge structures [40]. Knowledge structures 
are the mental templates that facilitate information processing and focus 
attention on selected aspects of the environment [67]. Both mechanisms 
signal what behaviour is desired and acceptable in organisations. Re-
searchers have argued that these can be used to shape the ways organ-
isational members think and act, and also mobilise them towards certain 
actions, and increase their sense of urgency about change (i.e. [68]. This 
can therefore minimise their resistance to change. For example, 
communicating the threatening nature of unpredictable, non-routine 
events generates a sense of urgency for change, because it delivers the 
clear message that “business as usual” is no longer possible [40,65]. 
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Frequent and powerful communication of a threat that must be turned 
into an opportunity can therefore mobilise the organisation on a large 
scale (Eg Ref. [69]. 
Middle managers’ structural position means they are better placed to 
interact with and influence their peers and employees at the operational 
level. This makes their support critical for change. 
Researchers using the threat-rigidity thesis, however, have suggested 
that in a threatening situation, top managers are likely to reduce 
participation and increase centralised decision-making. In anticipation 
of this, middle managers are likely to adjust their behaviour. For 
example, Staw et al. [52] noted that when a threat has been attributed to 
an external source and it is thought likely that the group can successfully 
meet the threat, then there is likely to be increased cohesiveness, lead-
ership support, and pressure for uniformity. The group will seek 
consensus and in so doing, will generally support the policies or position 
of the existing leadership. Consensus, however, is often achieved by 
restricting information and therefore reducing debate. Organisational 
attention is often measured by communications through official formats, 
such as letters to shareholders, and minutes of boards of directors, and 
through observations of meetings or informal events [61,70]. An anal-
ysis of different forms of communications, including written and oral, 
can provide a retrospective map of rhetorical tactics and the strategic 
agenda of the firm [62,71]. Studying organisational attention therefore 
helps us to understand how the strategic agenda was articulated and 
shared throughout the organisation, and how middle managers 
responded. 
The present research aims to understand the role of middle-managers 
in a radical, strategic change initiated by the top management team. In 
order to gain a better understanding of the interactions between the top 
and middle management, the use of different communication practices, 
vocabularies, and rhetorical tactics as a way to direct and reconstruct 
organisational attention as well as to mobilise for the implementation of 
the firm’s strategy is also analysed. 
3. Methodology 
We studied the strategic renewal journey of a Fortune 500 company. 
We chose to use a longitudinal case-based analysis of this particular 
company because this allowed us to address how and why particular 
activities are linked to strategic outcomes [72]. 
3.1. The study company 
The study organisation is a US-based multi-unit firm in the infor-
mation (IT) technology sector and is one of the leading firms in the 
global business software market. The company has a global presence, 
with more than 130,000 employees and 400,000 business customers in 
175 countries. It has several subsidiaries in three main regions: the 
Americas, EMEA (Europe, Middle East and Africa) and APAC (Asia Pa-
cific). The three main regions are divided into sub-regions. In 2016, the 
EMEA region had two main sub-regions: Western Europe and ECEMEA 
(East and Central Europe, Middle East and Africa). 
By 2010, the company was a highly profitable major player in the 
global business software market. At that time, a new phenomenon, cloud 
computing, emerged and presented a potential threat to the company’s 
future. The company’s top management decided on a major strategy 
shift, moving the focus from the traditional business to cloud computing. 
The authors already had a relationship with the company in the past, 
before the current research. The trigger for the research was the interest 
of the company’s management of the examined geography (ECEMEA 
region). Longitudinal research has started in 2007. The collected lon-
gitudinal data includes multiple comparable incidents over time, hence 
it offers stronger and more cumulative evidence that is required for 
effective contribution to the theory. 
3.2. A brief overview of the environment 
Large enterprises traditionally used a ‘buy and build your own’ 
approach to IT systems. They purchased and installed all the hardware 
needed to run the applications to support their business. The hardware 
was usually installed on the premises of the company in one or more 
server rooms, so this model is known as ‘on-premises’. The company’s IT 
department was responsible for maintaining the hardware and software 
stack and applying new patches and upgrades. Many companies 
partially or fully outsourced these tasks to external contractors. 
The development of high-speed networks and software solutions at 
the beginning of the 21st century allowed companies to start using IT 
differently. They no longer needed on-premises hardware to run their 
software. Instead, they could contract with external providers and access 
IT services remotely through the internet via ‘cloud computing’ [73,74]. 
Cloud computing, therefore, reduced the need to invest in physical 
infrastructure to store data or run business applications on-premises. 
From the customer’s point of view, the advantage of cloud over 
on-premises solutions is that these are subscription-based. Since large 
up-front investments were no longer needed the financially-sensitive 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) could also afford cloud so-
lutions. At that time, nevertheless, it was still a latent market need. 
Khanagha et al. [75] argued that cloud computing was a potential 
source of disruption in the telecommunications sector as early as 2009, 
with new offerings likely to make existing alternatives obsolete. In 2009, 
however, “figuring out whether it was wise to plan for harvesting the 
new Cloud opportunities or to consider burying the business model that 
the organisation had used for more than 150 years took about 5 years of 
experimentation in different directions” [75]:323). This was because of 
the high levels of ambiguity and the threat of cannibalisation of existing 
businesses. 
In the study organisation, therefore, when the strategic renewal 
journey towards cloud was initiated by the TMT, the core business was 
stable and lucrative, and there was no sign of maturity or decline in 
product life-cycle or demand. A new industry, the cloud, was, however 
beginning to emerge. The technology was in an early phase of devel-
opment; hence the ‘cloud’ was not only unproven but also highly risky. 
3.3. Data collection and analysis 
Cuervo-Cazurra et al. [76] argued that research on complex orga-
nisations fails to address the issue of subsidiaries located in particular 
countries or regions. These tend to compete and operate regionally, 
rather than globally. For example, business units in the EU primarily 
trade with other European businesses, while North American business 
units tend to trade in North America. Müller and Kunisch [15] also 
concluded that researchers from a dialectical perspective tend to study 
the change leader’s influence on discrete events or change episodes. 
In line with these suggestions, and to keep the scale of the research 
manageable, we restricted the in-depth interviews to the region covering 
Eastern and Central Europe, the Middle East, and Africa (ECEMEA). This 
is a large and very diverse region, and its management, therefore, pro-
vides a considerable challenge. The region also contains developing 
countries, where demand for on-premises solutions was still growing, 
making this business area lucrative. The ‘investing in the cloud’ meant 
abandoning highly profitable businesses, which suggested that the buy- 
in and involvement of middle management were likely to be critical. 
A multi-level approach was used for data collection to enrich insights 
into different managerial layers of the company. We analysed 11 public 
speeches made by the CEO and the Chairman of the Board during major 
events between 2009 and Spring 2018. Data were also collected via in- 
depth interviews with 23 employees at various levels of the company. 
All interviews took place at the respondent’s place of work and lasted 
about 90–120 min. In order to validate findings, 4 employees were 
interviewed 2 times between late 2016 and early 2018. 
Based on the company’s definition of ‘senior officers’ in its Code of 
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Ethics and Business Conduct, we categorised the chairman of the board, 
the chief executive officer and the senior vice president as part of the top 
management team. Vice presidents, directors, managers and sales ac-
count managers were all considered to be middle managers. 
The interviewees were chosen from several lines of business, 
including sales, business development, industry experts, finance and 
consulting. All of them were required to have frequent interaction with 
customers, business partners, peers, and the field of operations. This 
ensured that they had their own perceptions about the external envi-
ronment because this plays an important role in evaluating the proposed 
renewal journey. Other business lines, such as product development, 
also played an important role in the company’s renewal, but employees 
in those business units are not part of the hierarchy of the study region 
and report through their hierarchy to the CEO. The company also added 
missing competences by acquisitions during the study period. In this 
study, therefore, we focused on the go-to-market side (marketing, sales, 
and business development) of the strategic renewal of the company. 
One-fifth of the interviewees were with the top management, and the 
rest at middle managerial levels. The sample was representative of the 
ratio of top to middle management in the organisation, of four direct 
reports to one top manager. At lower levels, this ratio is more variable 
across functions. Table 1 shows the distribution of interviewees by 
managerial level. 
The interviews started with questions used to elicit the background 
and role of the interviewee, followed by questions about how the 
renewal journey unfolded. The interview protocols included semi- 
structured questions such as: ‘Describe the way the external environment 
has changed; Describe the way cloud computing changed the industry; How 
the structure of the company has changed since the introduction of cloud; 
How incentives and other motivational factors have changed since the 
introduction of cloud; and How did you perceive the strategic change and 
renewal of the company?’ etc. The aim of the questions was to explore the 
views, attitudes and feelings of those involved in the renewal of the 
company and augment the hard data obtained through document 
analysis. Data analysis involved reorganising the stories into chrono-
logical order, identifying key aspects, and thematic analysis. All the 
interviews were recorded and analysed using NVivo 11 computer-aided 
text-analysis software. 
To understand the evolution of the strategic renewal journey from 
traditional on-premises business to cloud, we also collected data through 
observations, participation in key events (e.g. annual company meet-
ings) and informal conversations. This ultimately allowed the triangu-
lation of the data and deeper insight into the process. Secondary data 
were also collected from the company’s annual reports from 2010 to 
2017 and company press releases. We converted public speeches, re-
ports and press releases, and other sources of communications into texts, 
and then used automated text analysis to examine archival data. 
This approach is consistent with previous research, which suggested 
that official papers, such as letters to shareholders or minutes of boards 
of directors, and observations of meetings or informal events, can pro-
vide a retrospective map of the rhetorical tactics and strategic agenda of 
the top management [71]. An analysis of different forms of communi-
cations, including written and oral, therefore helped us to understand 
how strategic agendas were articulated throughout the organisation, 
and how organisational members were mobilised to take particular 
actions. 
4. Findings 
4.1. Centralisation of the company 
The company consolidated its global IT operations in 2000. Before 
the consolidation, it had dozens of data centres worldwide. After 
consolidation, all the company’s IT operations were centralised into one 
large data centre at the company’s headquarters and backup site. That 
centralised IT system becomes the ‘single source of truth’ for company 
data and provided the top management with reliable and up-to-date 
information. As a member of the top management team said: 
“We use the technology we sell. [In the past] we come to meetings 
with spreadsheets and PowerPoints, but nobody had any data in sync 
with one another; each of us had our own versions. Now it doesn’t 
matter where I am, who am I with, everybody looks at the same 
dashboard.” 
After the IT consolidation, organisational decision-making was based 
on a management control system called the Sales Intelligence (SI) sys-
tem. It was mandatory to update the data in the SI system regularly. 
Sales representatives were required to enter details of all their sales 
opportunities, including product mix, expected revenue, discount level, 
contract date, sales phase, and competition. Those records were aggre-
gated into reports, showing, for example, the volume of open opportu-
nities, pipeline growth after a marketing campaign, historical win-loss 
ratio, pipeline-to-revenue conversion rate, sales revenue per account 
manager and sales cycle length by deal size. 
The sales intelligence system allowed the TMT to monitor and 
compare performance between products or regions on a real-time basis. 
They could also use that information to identify opportunities or actions 
to avoid and correct non-conformance. For example, knowing the 
pipeline volume and the historic pipeline-to-revenue conversion rate of 
a specific territory, the SI system would predict whether the sales rev-
enue target would be met in that territory. When the sales pipeline 
volume was large but the historical data for ‘sales revenue per account 
executive’ did not match, the SI might predict that the sales target would 
not be met, and additional actions would then be required. 
Besides the sales intelligence system, the company’s other important 
IT systems (financial, human resources, compensation, procurement, 
and customer service) were also centralised. Before the centralisation, 
local operations defined, for example, the sales compensation scheme 
for sales account managers. Country directors had the flexibility to 
decide the commission rate for different products, based on their busi-
ness priorities. After consolidation, all sales compensation globally was 
calculated by the central business application system, and compensation 
schemes were defined and approved by the top management, with no 
local deviation allowed. 
The consolidated IT systems enabled the TMT to centralise opera-
tions and decrease the autonomy of local units. This increased head-
quarters’ power to influence strategy implementation. The CEO was 
clear in an interview in 2006 that unifying IT systems had to be seen as 
an organisational issue, rather than technological. 
The unified IT systems supported the creation of an operating model 
where the top management was able to intervene, take actions, or make 
decisions without the involvement of middle or frontline managers. As 
the ex-CFO remembered in an interview, the CEO wanted to create a 
single centralised point of authority within the company: the CEO. The 
CEO’s view was that when orders from top managers have to go through 
several layers, they are likely to have changed significantly by the time 
they reach employees. He, therefore, wanted to create a structure where 
orders were communicated clearly and executed precisely down the 
hierarchy, and implementation could be tightly monitored. 
Table 1 
Overview of interviewees and their organisational positions.  
Position Number of interviewees 
Top management level 
CEO, Chairman of the Board 3 
Senior vice president (sales) 3 
Middle management level 
Vice president (sales, customer success) 4 
Director (sales, business development, consulting, 
finance) 
8 
Sales team (sales manager, sales account managers) 5  
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The country-based model, where all employees in a particular 
country reported to the Country Manager, was gradually replaced by a 
regional model. In the regional model, only the sales account managers 
reported to the Country Leader. Local managers of sales support, mar-
keting, customer services, finance, HR, legal, IT and other supporting 
functions reported directly to their own regional managers. The first 
‘common boss’ of the internal organisation’s local managers was often at 
the top management level. This organisational structure ensured that 
each business unit executed top-down orders. For example, IT would 
follow the direction of the global head of IT and not the local Country 
Leader. Changes in the IT policy (e.g. ordering different computers for 
employees, using the centralised procurement system) could therefore 
easily be implemented globally. 
One of the sales directors recalled the structural centralisation 
process: 
“Traditionally, we were very much a country-based model. The 
company existed as a number of countries that had a certain degree 
of autonomy …. Later that started changing to a more regional-based 
model. Local reporting lines started to become regional and global … 
That was beneficial. If we had still been using a country-based model, 
the regional leaders would have been very much dependent on 
hundreds of country managing directors to embrace the strategy or 
not.” 
4.2. The evolution of organisational attention 
The content analysis confirmed that the corporate strategy in 2009 
was about maintaining the company’s leadership position in the tradi-
tional (on-premises) software industry. There was no indication that 
cloud computing was on the top management’s radar. The confidence in 
on-premises business was justified by the CEO in an interview in 2009: 
“Will cloud computing kill us? The answer is no … it is only a rental 
system.” 
Our data collection did not reveal when exactly the top management 
team started to consider cloud technology as an industry to enter. The 
company does not publish the minutes of board meetings or internal 
discussions among the top management team. It is, however, clear that 
the decision was made between 2009 and 2011 because the CEO 
declared in a public speech in 2011: 
“Everyone has got a cloud, we need a cloud.” 
From 2011, top management communications were increasingly 
focused on the cloud. In the ‘Form 10-K’ annual report, the weighted 
percentage of the word ‘cloud(s)’ grew from 0% (0 mentions) in FY10 to 
0.2% (112 mentions) in FY11. After FY11, it grew continuously year-on- 
year, except in FY15, to 0.93% (505 mentions) in FY17. In FY17, the 
word ‘cloud(s)’ was mentioned nearly as many times in the annual 
report as ‘software’, which is the broader core business of the company 
(505 mentions of ‘cloud’ and 536 of ‘software’). 
The key message gradually changed, and in 2012, the company 
announced the ‘Industry’s broadest cloud strategy’. Since then, all 
corporate communications have aimed to emphasize and justify the 
renewal strategy. For example, a year later during the company’s annual 
conference, the CEO said: 
“Forecasts say that by 2025, 80% of the business applications used by 
enterprises will be in the cloud. The movement to the cloud is 
inevitable and accelerating.” 
As well as increased use of the word ‘cloud’, other words which co- 
occurred in management communications also showed a pattern. In its 
internal communications, the top management team started to clarify 
the “new” future for the organisation, how it would be different from the 
past, and how organisational members should contribute. The driving 
forces were identified, such as changing customer needs and organisa-
tional benefits. Besides defining the situation – the emerging new in-
dustry that threatened the organisation’s core – the communications 
aimed to generate organisation-wide support for change. They, there-
fore, communicated the risks, both of investing into an as-yet-unproven 
technology and of losing competence if no investment was made. This 
ambivalence helped to mobilise and unite the workforce by reinforcing 
the corporate identity and sending a signal that “we must and can beat 
this challenge”. 
Analysis of both documentation and interviews confirmed that re- 
positioning the business model into cloud solutions was a bold, risky 
move. The word risk consequently began to appear in association with 
the cloud. For example, the risk associated with the transition into cloud 
business was in 26th position of the 29 ‘risk’ items in the company’s 
FY11 annual report, but in the FY16 annual report, it was the number 
one threat and remained so in FY17. At that point, the risk was defined in 
the annual report as “our cloud strategy … may adversely affect our reve-
nues and profitability”. At the beginning of the process, the risk could not 
be fully anticipated, as there was too much ambiguity. As the opportu-
nity unfolded and the transformation became clearer, the risks – and 
communication of the risk – also became more explicit. 
4.3. The evolution of the journey 
The analysis of the interviews and documents showed a clear 
renewal journey for the study company. The beginning of the strategic 
renewal journey coincided with the appointment of a new President in 
2010, who had been named to the company’s Board of Directors. The 
new president was an external hire and reported directly to the CEO. The 
CEO commented on the new member of the TMT: 
“There is no executive in the IT world with more relevant experience: 
an outstanding executive and a proven winner … [the company’s] 
future are engineering complete and integrated hardware-software 
systems, and we need people like him.” 
However, when the appointment was announced, there was no 
mention of a new strategy or renewal of the company. The introduction 
of new members to the TMT is important for the successful imple-
mentation of strategic change [77]. In this particular case, the 
appointment of the new president can retrospectively be understood as a 
signal for the transformation. The top management team was preparing 
to take the business to the next level. Hiring from outside is known to 
help rejuvenate businesses because outside candidates are not burdened 
by the past, they likely to have fresh perspectives on doing business, 
hence they can put change strategies into perspective. All this was 
confirmed in the study company. 
It is important to emphasize, that when the top management team 
announced the cloud strategy in 2011, cloud as an industry was in its 
‘early adoption’ phase. The company was a market leader in on-premises 
business software solutions. Its key customers, large enterprises, were 
far from considering cloud-based solutions. The top management, 
however, anticipated that cloud adoption was likely to be a major 
market trend in the future. Drawing on their understanding of this, they 
decided to change their focus and become ambidextrous. They initiated 
a significant investment in the resources needed to build cloud-based 
products. 
The top management also decided to mobilise the salesforce to 
explore the feasibility of cloud solutions, even though the ongoing 
exploitation of on-premises products was also required. There was no 
structural separation. The same sales representatives were selling both 
types of products, creating a contextually ambidextrous organisation. 
The temptation to favour pre-existing assets over the moving to the new 
core technology was high. In the study company, the double focus 
created confusion, and the expected results did not fully materialise. The 
sales of on-premises products remained high in volume, with sales 
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representatives arguing that existing customers still insisted on buying 
on-premises solutions. 
The contextual ambidexterity also created some tension in the sales 
team. The number of new opportunities was potentially greater with 
cloud, but the sales process became more challenging. Existing cus-
tomers were not ready to move. They had usually made large in-
vestments in hardware, which made them reluctant to change. It was 
also not financially attractive for the salesforce to sell cloud solutions. 
For on-premises solutions, the inflow of revenue to the company was a 
single, large, upfront payment, so the commission to the sales repre-
sentative was one, large amount. In contrast, when a subscription-based 
cloud deal was closed, the revenue was approximately one-third of an 
on-premises deal, which resulted in a lower commission. Cloud reve-
nues, however, are earned annually, at the same amount, which makes 
the organisation better off after the third year. The difference in com-
mission was a major drawback for the sales team because it was pain-
fully costly for individuals. Not surprisingly, the actual sales of on- 
premises products remained high despite the signals communicated by 
the TMT. 
The top management acted quickly to address the situation. To speed 
up the transition, new financial incentives and KPIs were introduced. 
Multipliers were introduced in the sales compensation plan: sales rep-
resentatives earned a bonus that was three to four times higher by selling 
cloud than on-premises solutions. Financial rewards and incentives have 
had a positive influence on achieving ambidextrous goals. Intensive 
training was also launched in 2013 to mobilise the salesforce. When the 
organisation still did not follow the strategy fully, the top management 
applied administrative restrictions to the sale of certain on-premises 
products, to discourage their sales. Sales representatives had to 
request special approval from top managers in advance, and even if 
approval was given, they received only a fraction of the normal 
commission. 
Meanwhile, a new sales unit was established in the EMEA region, 
with 1400 employees. This unit’s role was to focus exclusively on selling 
cloud solutions to SMEs, a customer segment which had not previously 
been part of the company’s focus. The subscription model meant that 
cloud solutions required much smaller up-front investment than on- 
premises solutions. SMEs could therefore afford these solutions. By 
embracing the new technology, the company aimed to turn non- 
consumers into consumers. The sales method was different from the 
traditional account management model, and the new sales organisation 
used telemarketing and telesales. 
The ‘SME’ sales unit was structurally separated from the core en-
terprise sales unit. The new sales unit operated as a highly cost-effective 
call-centre supported by the latest technology. Potential customers were 
contacted by telephone, email, chat, video calls, and even social media. 
As one interviewee (Sales VP) explained, there was a shift in sales 
communication with customers: 
“With key accounts, one prefers face-to-face negotiation. With small 
customers that would be too expensive. And this is about to change … in 
2014, only 30% of communication with customers took place by phone, 
in 2016 it’s 80% and in the future, it could be 100%!” 
The required profile of sales account managers therefore also 
changed. Previously, many years of experience in selling IT systems had 
been required for new employees to join the sales team. Sales repre-
sentatives selling cloud solutions, however, did not need in-depth IT 
knowledge. Instead, they needed background in HR, finance, and mar-
keting, because their customers were from the functional departments of 
target companies. The sales representatives needed to discuss and un-
derstand their clients’ specific functional problems to advise them on 
suitable cloud solutions. The overall sales process required different 
skills, mostly understanding the business needs rather than technical. 
The core customers, large enterprises, were initially concerned about 
the performance and features of the cloud products. In particular, they 
were worried that these would be inferior to existing solutions. How-
ever, the company strongly communicated the benefits of cloud to these 
customers. The traditional sales team was given incentives to offer a 
combination of hardware and software products to their clientele. 
Gradually, however, more and more sanctions were placed on the sales 
of on-premises products (e.g. withdrawal of discounts, and lower com-
missions), which discouraged sales. The sales team were encouraged to 
promote elements of the product portfolio that could be combined into 
integrated hardware and software stacks. As one member of the TMT 
said during their interview, the company aimed to provide “enterprises 
with a complete and comprehensive solution by improving product 
stability, performance, scalability, reliability, and manageability, as well 
as reduced complexity”. 
The organisational culture is also rooted in high performance and 
innovativeness. This meant that the tension from the rivalry between 
“new” competence and “old” competence was not new but instead seen 
as something institutionalised and part of everyday work. As one 
interviewee said: 
“There has been always a lot of internal competition with other 
teams. This built-in rivalry is the fundamental nature of the com-
pany, unlike in other companies I used work for. I guess this men-
tality, the culture of rivalry, has made the company very successful 
especially in times of change.” 
4.4. The role of middle managers in the journey 
The company’s renewal journey from a focused business to an 
ambidextrous organisation was a deliberate, top-down initiative. One 
member of the top management team recalled: 
“It is a choice of a model of transformation. No consensus, top-down. 
And it can work. The difficulty is if you don’t engage with the minds 
and hearts of the people, there is a risk that they become 
mercenaries.” 
The involvement of frontline and middle management was limited to 
the execution of the strategy. One middle manager interviewee 
commented: 
“It started as a firm mandate. We did not have a choice. We were told 
this is your number for the cloud, just do it. All of the sayings like let 
me talk to my customer, let me see what is in my pipeline – all of 
them were ignored. People were told, ‘just do it’. That was harsh 
because it removed any discussion from the table whether it was the 
right thing to do or not.” 
It was evident that middle managers were not active in shaping the 
strategy and only had a passive role in executing the strategy. One 
middle-manager interviewee commented that there were no attempts to 
decentralise decision-making: 
“The strategy is defined at headquarters and rolled out to be 
executed. This is clear … certain decisions are made only at the CEO 
level and maybe one level down. I don’t think that there was a lot of 
debate below that level in the company. We may or may not like it, 
but that’s the way it is. And on balance, it works pretty well.” 
Despite the restricted information and lack of debate, people from 
the lower ranks—including middle management—accepted their pas-
sive role and restricted influence throughout the strategy. The opinion of 
top managers dominated, and the consensus was to “go with the flow”. 
Individuals, therefore, worked to achieve their individual goals on their 
own. The middle management interviewees indicated that when they 
encountered setbacks (e.g. risks of not meeting the targets) they felt that 
they needed to “sort it out for themselves”. 
The passive role of the middle managers in strategy formulation did 
not mean they had no decision-making power when executing it. As one 
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interviewee explained, while strategy was formulated top-down, the 
middle management had considerable freedom in its daily execution. 
“There is a whole range of different strategic activities at all levels. 
Nobody is telling me precisely how to go to the market in my terri-
tory. Nobody is telling me how to inspire my team and how to take 
the solutions to the market. …. There is a lot of empowerment in the 
company regarding the execution of the strategy, but at the same 
time it is very clear that fundamental decisions are not taken 
democratically.” 
The centralised management control system, which was widely used 
across the entire organization, supported the top management with 
timely information about everything that happened in the organisation. 
The TMT was, therefore, able to enforce the new strategy with minimal 
organisational inertia and resistance. The management control system 
allowed the TMT to bypass middle management. For example, when the 
change in sales compensation was decided by the top management, to 
increase motivation for selling cloud, global implementation was very 
fast, and the commission calculation was changed for all sales associates 
globally without any active middle management involvement. One 
middle manager explained: 
“It’s not a company that rewards sharing responsibility or a very broad 
scope of contribution. Each of us has a very clear target, very clear as-
signments, and a very clear measurement system. The good thing is that it 
is very clear.” 
The top management team could monitor the impact of the new 
compensation system on the sales pipeline even in the short term. When 
an intervention was needed, further financial incentives were added. 
The implementation of these changes was again fast and smooth, 
without organisation-wide discussion or any middle management 
involvement in the decision-making. 
When the hiring of 1400 new employees for the new sales organi-
sation was decided, the top management could monitor the progress of 
the entire hiring and onboarding process in the HR system. The goal was 
to hire the new employees fast, and a monthly target was set for new 
hires in each location. The top managers could follow the number of 
candidates in different phases of the hiring process, and therefore keep 
the middle managers in the new organisation under pressure to meet the 
hiring targets. 
Another example of the top-down approach is changes introduced in 
product marketing. Both cloud products and the new target customers, 
SMEs, required different messages and communications. The new mar-
keting messages and activities were defined from the top and monitored 
closely. The local organisations had very little influence over those 
messages. The impact of the new marketing messages was measured by 
the amount generated in the sales pipeline, which appeared in SI, the 
management control system. This real-time market intelligence allowed 
top managers to intervene when it was necessary. They could, for 
example, monitor how the new marketing messages resonated with 
customers and modify them if necessary, based on the results reported 
by the system. 
Cloud was a new market, so the pricing of cloud-based products was 
challenging. Top managers monitored the win-loss ratio and the reasons 
deals were lost through the sales intelligence system, and regularly 
adjusted the prices. If needed, extra discounts were given for a limited 
time to be competitive on price. 
5. Discussion: Shaping a dynamic environment by the controlled 
renewal 
The case study highlighted the process of becoming an ambidextrous 
organisation. There are several novel contributions. First, the study re-
veals that a large, multi-unit firm needed structural separation to ensure 
the transition into a new core technology. Second, the middle managers, 
despite their structural position to seize power, were rather passive in 
the strategy formulation process. This does not mean that they were 
merely executing orders. While the top managers had the power to 
define the strategy, middle managers still had decision-making power 
when implementing it along with their daily routines. Nevertheless, the 
management control system allowed top managers to regain influence 
over the organisation’s actions in balancing exploitation with explora-
tion. Third, the structural separation, as well as the reliance on MCS 
during the renewal journey together, mobilised and incentivized middle 
managers and the entire organisation to ‘unlearn’ old routines. Fourth, 
the management control system allowed the top managers to maintain 
flexibility as well as control over the execution, and make timely in-
terventions when needed. Fifth, the MCS ensured uniformity and 
consensus for middle managers in translating goals into initiatives. 
Therefore, management control systems can have a profound impact on 
the development of organisational ambidexterity. The next sections 
briefly elaborate on these contributions. 
5.1. The major learning points of the journey 
The journey to becoming ambidextrous offers several learning points 
emerged, which are shown in Table 2. 
Organisational ambidexterity requires the simultaneous presence of 
exploitation and exploration, coinciding with differences in technology 
and market maturation. It is characterised by the simultaneous presence 
of mature and emerging activities [78]. We believe that putting the 
firm’s actions into perspective helps to answer Gilsing and Nooteboom’s 
[79] question of how one firm gets away from the dominant designs in 
technology into a round of (radical) innovation. It provides insights 
about the potential of novel elements, and the constraints imposed by 
existing designs on the realisation of that potential. 
The journey began with the aim of establishing contextual ambi-
dexterity. The sales team was asked to extend its portfolio by selling the 
newly-developed and acquired cloud products. This strategy, however, 
did not fully work. The TMT, therefore, decided to create a structurally- 
separate unit that would solely focus on explorative activities. The 
structural separation was achieved in two consecutive steps. The first 
step was to start supply-side search activities (2nd phase), and the third 
step was to engage in demand-side search activities (3rd phase). 
Table 2 
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During the 2nd phase, the original sales team focused on the 
exploitation of existing technology and local knowledge by delivering 
the best value in the industry with integrated hardware-software solu-
tions. This was characterised by the combination of resources across 
different parts of the portfolio, and actively pursuing synergies between 
them. It ultimately resulted in the development of new products and/or 
market applications. The exploitation strategy proved to be successful 
and increased the overall size of the attainable market. The process 
required tremendous innovation, but the knowledge and competencies 
required were local and familiar to the firm. The firm’s expertise 
consequently deepened, which is very much a definition of exploitation. 
Meanwhile, the TMT continued to fund the development and 
acquisition of cloud businesses. The boundary-spanning acquisitions 
allowed the company to step away from its technological trajectory and 
venture into new and emerging technology. Back then, the technology 
was still at an early stage of development, and the eventual direction of 
the market was not clear. The TMT also faced the risk, at least in the 
short term, of being outperformed by competing organisations with 
more focus. Nevertheless, the acquisitions allowed the company to 
broaden its competences. By expanding its operations into cloud ser-
vices, the TMT definitively acted as visionaries and active influencers of 
the environment. Sidhu et al. [22] found that greater non-local sup-
ply-side search is positively associated with innovativeness in more 
dynamic environments. 
The uncertainty and risks involved in entering an emerging industry 
in its early stages are both very high. The study company purposefully 
restrained its initial demand-side search to its existing customers. At that 
time, there was also not yet strong market demand for cloud solutions. 
In the second phase, technological knowledge played an important 
role in becoming an ambidextrous organisation. Once the competence in 
cloud technology had been accumulated, the firm started to look for 
opportunities to commercialise it in the form of new products. That was 
the point of transition to the next (3rd) phase, where the company 
engaged in a demand-based search for both local and more remote 
groups of customers. Danneels [80] argued that a deep understanding of 
customer needs is necessary to understand how the technology satisfies 
those needs and the value that customers would place on satisfying those 
needs. This understanding drove the TMT’s attention and organisational 
efforts. 
In the 3rd phase, the demand-side search was initiated in two di-
rections. First, existing customers were targeted for both on-premises 
and cloud products. Second, the new sales organization targeted 
small- and medium-sized organisations, mainly with cloud products. As 
far as we are aware, selling IT products via telesales had never previ-
ously been tested by an incumbent at such a large scale. There had been 
a limited number of trials, but no one had experimented with that level 
of expansion: where an enterprise-focused multinational IT company 
targeted a non-traditional market segment, SMEs, with a different sales 
model and emerging technology. By targeting low-end, initially un-
served customers with emerging technology, we argue that the study 
company disrupted the industry. In summary, the demand-side search 
for new knowledge allowed the organization to accumulate knowledge 
as well as experiences in testing the viability of its renewal strategy. 
Consequently, the organization become truly ambidextrous through 
Stages 2 and 3, which are both characterized as highly experimental and 
involving exploratory learning. The contextual ambidexterity was not a 
suitable organizational setup to address the business opportunity that 
the TMT intended to explore. Results, therefore, confirm the findings of 
[89] that an adequately-resourced, spatially-separated organization is 
crucial for inventing a new business that is in many ways very different 
from the old one. 
The communication agenda also changed in line with the phases of 
the renewal journey. As more competence and knowledge were accu-
mulated, the messages became more optimistic. They moved from 
awareness of emerging technology, through describing a profound 
threat, to painting a confident and winning future. 
5.2. Shaping a dynamic environment by the controlled renewal 
This longitudinal case study has shown that business intelligence 
systems allowed the study firm to become ambidextrous in a top-down, 
closely controlled journey. The data-driven and automated feedback 
system enabled the TMT to learn fast, with less effort required to coor-
dinate activity. This, in turn, substituted for the active involvement of 
middle managers. 
Previous research (e.g. Ref. [6] suggested that the involvement of 
frontline managers is essential to the renewal process in organisations 
facing permanent turbulence and uncertainty. Both top and middle 
management should take an active role. However, in our study organi-
zation, the received wisdom that the renewal process may be initiated 
from the top but requires considerable engagement from all levels in 
shaping the direction of the transformation did not hold. Wilden et al. 
[81] also argued that renewal in highly competitive and turbulent 
markets is possible with an organic organizational structure that pro-
vides a basis for the use of processes to sense and seize external op-
portunities via decentralized decision-making. 
The industry in this study is hypercompetitive. The technological 
development in the first decades of the 21st century was evolving 
exponentially rather than linearly [82], creating a hypercompetitive 
environment. Our results are therefore surprising. The incumbent firm 
did not behave in line with predictions but took a new approach in 
several ways. First, the top management did not aim to involve middle 
management in giving meaning to the emerging technology. The middle 
management did not actively participate in setting the strategic direc-
tion of the firm. Frontline staff and middle managers remained largely 
excluded from strategy-making, with a fairly passive role. The perfor-
mance evaluation of units remained revenue-driven, and rewards were 
based on market achievements. There was limited team-working across 
levels and functions while the new renewal strategy was unfolding. The 
interviews confirmed that the top-down change was hard for middle 
management, particularly because there was no room for discussion or 
negotiation about its content and scope. 
The results also confirm Chang and Hughes’ [83] point that when 
used intelligently, reward systems signal strategically relevant goals and 
consequently reinforce certain behaviours among organizational 
members. 
The organization therefore does not fit into any of the idealized 
renewal journeys suggested by previous studies. We suggest that it is 
necessary to rethink the role of middle management in the face of a 
dynamic environment and technology change. Business intelligence can 
provide accurate real-time information to decision-makers, eliminating 
the need for the involvement of lower-level managers. The well- 
functioning decision support system and organizational communica-
tion strategy can together substitute for collective sense-making and 
shared strategic schemas. Our findings, however, appear to contradict 
the assumption that a directed renewal journey is less suited for firms in 
dynamic, rapidly-changing environments. 
This renewal journey was therefore a hybrid form of the two types of 
journeys (directed and transformative) suggested by Volberda et al. [6]. 
We describe it as a controlled renewal journey (Table 3). 
In this journey, top managers explicitly managed the balance of 
exploration and exploitation by bringing in new competencies to some 
units and using well-developed competencies in others. In controlled 
renewal, the shift from one direction to another can be driven by a small 
strategic apex even in a multi-unit firm with many thousands of em-
ployees. The main advantage of this type of journey is that the organi-
zation can fully realize the advantage of highly centralized formal 
planning and control while becoming resilient and ambidextrous. This 
could provide a new competitive advantage. 
This matches the perspective of Prahalad and Hamel [84]; who 
argued that strategic renewal depends on the strategic intent of the CEO 
or corporate management and should be based on superior industry 
foresight. The study also shed light on organizational learning. With 
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strong central control and directives, the new explorative learning from 
the field – which is important in a dynamic environment – as restricted 
to the top management level. This silo effect is likely to reduce the 
benefit for the whole organization [85]. 
The case study also confirms the threat–rigidity thesis. The external 
threat situation was used by the top managers to reduce participation 
and increase centralized decision-making. In anticipation of the pressure 
for uniformity, middle managers adjusted their behaviour. Instead of 
demanding involvement, they sought consensus and in doing so, sup-
ported the policies or position of the existing leadership. As a result, the 
top managers’ influence over the actions of organizational members 
became greater and eventually, they gained the power to deliver the 
strategy. 
6. Summary and future research directions 
The strategic renewal attempts are highly challenging and can 
generate huge organizational tension, especially in multi-unit firms. 
Successful implementation requires a significant amount of innovation, 
experimentation, and trial-and-error learning. Successful structural 
separation of exploitation and exploration can help the organization to 
live through the challenging times until the ambiguity is cleared up and 
enough knowledge is gained about the real value of the new strategy. 
The longitudinal study of a multi-unit firm allowed us to highlight 
how ambidexterity was achieved, including from the middle managers’ 
perspective. Previous studies have had contradictory results, which 
might be explained by the differences between the management control 
systems used in other organisations. 
Our study was limited to a single case study, and its results may 
therefore not be widely generalizable. However, it could be a role model 
for successful large-scale strategic renewals which will be numerous in 
hypercompetitive environments. The lack of a comparative case and 
avoid the trap of over-determination of historical events, multiple data 
sources were analysed. The analysis of organisation rhetoric allowed 
historical counterfactual analysis and to contrast interviewees percep-
tions with facts. The replication of the study across cases is also chal-
lenging. This kind of renewal journey calls for cases which used to show 
similarity in processes across different settings rather than to explain 
differences as suggested by Yin (2014). 
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